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1. Introduction 
AN ASSESSMENT OF QEC FORECASTS 1984-94 
by Terry Baker and Delma Duggan 
All regular economic forecasters should carry out periodic assessments of 
the accuracy of their forecasts. These are not normally for publication, but rather 
to assure themselves that there are no systematic biases in their work and to 
identify avoidable weaknesses in their forecasting approach. 
In an ideal world, published assessments of the forecasting record over a 
suitable period should be undertaken by a disinterested third party, preferably 
including a comparative study of forecasts from different sources. In the real 
world, third parties have proved uninterested rather than disinterested, leaving 
the individual forecaster to decide whether to publish his or her own 
assessments. 
There are obvious dangers that such self-assessment either will be, or will be 
perceived to be, unduly partial, with data selected to show the record in the best 
possible light, and errors which cannot be concealed glossed over with special 
pleading. These dangers can largely be overcome by selecting data according to 
a logical pattern, based on their importance to the forecast rather. than on the 
favourability of their results, and by maintaining as objective an approach as 
possible to the analysis of the record. It must be remembered also that past 
forecasts are a matter of public record and can thus be checked quite easily. 
Self assessment does have some advantages, in that the author is generally 
better placed than an observer to explain why past errors occurred, and to 
weigh the implications of these in terms of past conclusions and future 
forecasting techniques. 
We attempted to bear these considerations in mind when we published a 
detailed assessment of our forecasting record for the years from 1984 to 1990 in 
the Spring 1991 issue of the Quarterly Economic Commentary. Now appears to be 
an appropriate time to update this exercise. The Irish economy is again near a 
cyclical peak, as it was in 1984 and 1990, the publication of National Income and 
Expenditure 1994 has resolved some of the reservations we had about using NIE 
1993 as a standard of comparison, and forthcoming changes in national accounts 
methodology could rerider comparisons of past forecasts with future editions of 
NIE unduly complicated. 
Comparing economic forecasts with the actual out-turn is a less simple 
exercise than it might appear. This is for two main reasons. The first is the 
question of selectivity, already referred to. For each year there are generally 
forecasts in eight separate QECs, each carrying predictions for well over 
100 items. It is obviously not feasible to analyse, let alone present, comparisons 
for over 800 observations for each year! The solution adopted, as in 1991, is to 
restrict the analysis to the initial QEC forecast for each year, generally made in 
the preceding summer, and the final QEC estimate made in the spring following 
the end of the year. Analysis is similarly restricted to the main expenditure 
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components of GNP, together with the two main income components and a few 
key employment and price variables. 
The other major difficulty is that there is seldom a unique measure of what 
the actual out-tum was. NIE estimates for each year tend to be significantly 
revised in succeeding years, with no guarantee than even the final estimates 
represent a true picture of reality, which of course is inherently unobservable. 
Our method of dealing with NIE revisions is analogous to our treatment of the 
range of QEC forecasts, in that we present the preliminary and the latest NIE 
estimates, with the greater concentration on the latter, as it is reasonable to 
assume that successive revisions generally improve the quality of the estimates. 
Guided by the findings of the 1991 assessment, the format of this 
presentation is as follows. 
The first issue to be addressed is that of possible bias in the forecasts of 
macro-economic aggregates and specific major components, on the grounds that 
a persistent tendency towards either optimism or pessimism would constitute a 
serious fault in the forecasting record. 
The second point to be considered is the issue of predicting the economic 
cycle, in terms of the timing and the amplitude of fluctuations in the growth 
rate. The past record of short-term economic forecasting, in this and other 
countries, suggests that it would be unreasonable to expect a high degree of 
accuracy in this regard, but that an appropriate criterion would be whether the 
forecasts outperform alternative methods of prediction which eschew the 
application of judgement. 
As in the earlier study, GNP forecasts for each individual year will be 
discussed in some detail to illustrate the manner in which unfolding events 
influence both forecasts and the outcome. Finally we shall investigate whether 
inaccurate forecasts have led to our giving any advice which, with the benefit of 
hindsight, was seriously misleading, and draw general conclusions from the 
current exercise. 
2. Bias 
Although the 1991 study found that our real GNP forecasts from 1984 to 
1990 had no persistent bias, the ESRI in general and the QEC in particular have 
continued to be regarded in some quarters as optimistic forecasters. The eleven 
years from 1984 to 1994 inclusive, comprising the greater part of two economic 
cycles provide a suitable period to re-examine whether there has been consistent 
bias in QEC forecasts. 
The following set of tables show the annual average percentage changes 
over the period in QEC forecasts and official NIE estimates of major national 
accounts aggregates and other key economic variables. Each table shows the 
annual average percentage increase for the whole period and for the two 
sub-periods 1984 to 1989 and 1990 to 1994, each representing a cycle virtually 
from peak to peak. In most cases the increases are shown for the initial QEC 
forecasts, the final QEC estimates, the preliminary NIE estimates and the latest 
NIE estimates, which is NIE 1994 for recent years. 
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(a) Current Price Aggregates 
Table 1: Current Price Aggregates 
Annual Average Percenta5<e Increase 
1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 
Current Price GNP 
QEC Initial 7.0 7.4 7.1 
QECFinal 7.4 6.9 7.1 
NIEPrelim. 7.1 7.0 7.0 
NIE Latest 7.7 6.7 7.2 
Current Price GDP 
7.4 7.4 7.4 
8.1 6.8 7.5 
8.0 6.2 7.2 
8.7 6.4 7.7 
Current Price Net Factor 
Flow 
10.2 7.3 8.9 
17.7 6.8 11.5 
17.0 0.8 9.3 
18.2 5.0 12.0 
Table 1 sets out the results for current price GNP, GDP and net factor flows. 
There is virtually no difference between the initial and final QEC average GNP 
growth over the entire period, and both fall within the range of NIE estimates. 
In both sub-periods the QEC final estimate falls within the NIE range. The initial 
QEC forecasts were marginally low in the first period and high in the second, 
especially when compared with the latest NIE estimates. 
The current price GDP forecasts for the entire period were also within the 
range of NIE estimates. Here, however, there was significant underprediction in 
the first sub-period and over-prediction in the second, when the QEC initial 
forecast is compared with the latest NIE estimate. 
Major discrepancies occur in the final section of the table, where average 
increases in net factor flows are compared. In the first sub-period, the initial 
forecasts were much too low, mainly because the predictions for 1984 and 1985 
were made before the "black-hole" revisions to official balance of payments 
estimates were available. In the second sub-period the initial QEC forecasts were 
too high, partly in reaction to the underprediction revealed in the earlier 
exercise, but mainly due to a failure to foresee the substantial falls in factor 
outflows in 1990 and 1991 after some years of rapid increase. Final QEC 
estimates were close to the out-turn in the first sub-period, when most of the 
data were available by the time of publication. With the timing of official 
balance of payments estimates much slower in the second period, the accuracy 
of the final QEC estimates inevitably suffered. Over the full eleven year period, 
however, the evidence does not suggest a significant persistent bias in the 
forecasts. 
A noteworthy feature is the scale of the revisions in the official estimates, 
especially in the second sub-period. With such a divergence between 
preliminary and latest NIE estimates, it is difficult to define what outcome the 
QEC is attempting to predict, and unreasonable to expect a high degree of 
accuracy in relation to any subsequent measure. 
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(b) Constant Price Aggregates 
Table 2: Constant Price Aggregates 
Annual Average Percenta e Increase 
1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 
Constant Price GNP Constant Price GDP Constant Price Net Factor 
Flow 
QEC Initial 2.1 3.9 2.9 2.5 4.0 3.2 6.4 5.2 5.9 
QECFinal 2.2 4.0 3.0 3.1 4.4 3.7 12.2 7.3 9.9 
NIE Prelim. Exp. 2.0 5.5 3.6 3.3 5.0 4.1 14.2 2.6 8.9 
NIE Latest Exp. 2.6 4.6 3.5 3.8 4.7 4.2 14.6 6.3 10.8 
NIE Latest Ou ut 2.2 3.8 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.7 
The accuracy or otherwise of forecasts tends to be judged mainly on the 
basis of the increase in constant price GNP, frequently referred to as simply "the 
growth rate". In fact, this is an over-simplification, as there are two official 
estimates of constant price GNP, one based on deflating expenditure on GNP 
and the other based on deflating output. Because the QEC forecasts only deflate 
the expenditure items, the obvious comparison is with the constant price 
expenditure estimates in the national accounts. The latest output estimates are 
also included in the table, largely to show the extent of the divergence in 
cumulative growth between the two methods. 
There is little difference between the average growth in QEC initial forecasts 
and final estim~tes, indicating that upward and downward revisions in the 
course of individual years roughly cancel out. Compared with the latest NIE 
expenditure estimates, the QEC forecasts have been slightly too pessimistic over 
the entire period and in both sub-periods. This change with regard to the 1991 
findings regarding the 1984/89 period reflects official revisions since 1991 to 
growth rates in that sub-period. 
The fact that QEC current price forecasts were unbiased, while constant 
price forecasts show a slight downward bias, is almost entirely due to a 
tendency to apply too high an average export price deflator, especially during 
the second sub-period. It is interesting, if perhaps accidental, that the average 
increase in the QEC forecasts is very close to that in the official output measure 
of real GNP, in both sub-periods and over the entire eleven years, More 
crucially, the QEC forecasts. did predict the substantial increase in the average 
rate of growth in the second sub-period compared with the first. 
The QEC forecasts of average real GDP growth similarly were closer to the 
output measure than to the expenditure, which they tended to underpredict. 
Constant price net factor flows were underpredicted in the final sub~period and 
overpredicted in the second. The overprediction in recent years was much less 
marked in constant prices than in current prices, because of the excessive export 
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price deflators already referred to, which, of course, are also applied to net 
factor flows. 
(c) Domestic and External Demand 
Table 3: Domestic and External Demand 
Annual Average Percentage Increase 
1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 
QEC Initial 
QECFinal 
NIEPrelim. 
NIE Latest 
Constant Price Domestic 
Demand 
1.3 3.8 2.4 
1.3 2.4 1.8 
1.1 2.0 1.5 
2.0 2.3 2.1 
Constant Price Exports Constant Price Imports 
7.5 8.0 7.7 5.7 7.4 6.5 
9.4 8.4 8.9 5.9 5.3 5.6 
9.7 10.0 9.9 5.2 6.0 5.6 
9.9 10.1 10.0 7.3 6.3 6.8 
Domestic demand is defined here as excluding stock changes, both to 
facilitate comparison in terms of percentage growth and also because large-scale 
stock movements in Ireland are generally associated with fluctuations in 
agricultural exports rather than changes in domestic demand. It can be seen 
that, for reasons to be discussed later, the average initial QEC forecasts of 
growth in domestic demand were much too high in the later sub-period, and 
rather excessive over the whole period. Final QEC estimates were much closer 
to reality, although the scale of NIE revisions makes the interpretation of the 
actual outcome somewhat problematical. 
Initial QEC forecasts of constant price exports of goods and services were 
significantly too low in both sub-periods. Final QEC estimates were slightly too 
low in the first sub-period, due mainly to overestimating the export price 
deflator. This factor was still present in the second sub-period, but the main 
reason for the decline in the accuracy of the final QEC estimates was, of course, 
the absence of up-to-date trade statistics when the final estimates for 1993 and 
1994 were made. 
The average QEC initial forecasts for constant price imports were 
reasonably accurate over the entire period, lying between the preliminary and 
latest NIE estimates. Actual import growth was underpredicted in the first 
sub-period but significantly over-predicted in the second. This is not surprising 
in view of the simultaneous overprediction of domestic demand, as import 
forecasts are based on the expected growth of final demand. Final QEC 
estimates were too low in both sub-periods, especially in comparison with 
revised NIE estimates. This is due more to official revisions of import values 
than to the use of a slightly excessive import price deflator. 
37 
( d) Domestic Demand Components 
Table 4: Domestic Demand Components 
Annual Average Percentage Increase 
1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 
QEC Initial 
QECFinal 
NIEPrelim. 
NIE Latest 
Retail Sales Volume 
1.8 
2.0 
1.9 
3.9 
0.9 
Constant Price 
Consumption 
3.6 
2.7 
2.0 
2.3 
2.4 
2.6 
2.3 
2.0 
3.2 
1.6 
Constant Price Govern. Constant Price Investment 
-1.1 0.6 
-1.4 2.2 
-1.4 2.4 
-1.2 3.1 
-0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.8 
2.3 
1.6 
0.8 
-0.1 
7.3 
1.8 
1.7 
1.5 
4.5 
1.7 
1.2 
0.6 
NIE estimates of personal consumption must be treated with some caution, 
because the item is, at least partially, derived as a residual in balancing the 
national accounts. In particular, the doubling of the average growth in constant 
price consumption in the late '80s between the preliminary and latest NIE 
appears suspect, as it could result from revisions to consumption levels being 
phased in over too short a period. In the first sub-period at least, the preliminary 
NIE estimate probably provides a truer yardstick of comparison for the QEC 
forecasts than the latest revisions. 
On this basis the initial QEC forecasts were reasonably unbiased in the first 
sub-period, but significantly overoptimistic in the second, primarily through 
failing to predict the relative stagnation of consumption in 1990 and 1991. Final 
QEC estimates were also slightly too high in the later sub-period. In this respect 
the changing relationship between the retail sales index and the NIE 
consumption index is interesting. In the first sub-period, constant price 
consumption, even on the preliminary estimates, grew more than twice as fast 
as the volume of retail sales. In the second sub-period the growth in real 
consumption has been slower than that in the retail sales volume index, the 
main short-term indicator of consumption trends. 
The initial QEC forecasts of current government spending predicted the fall 
in volume reasonably accurately in the first sub-period. However they seriously 
underpredicted the reversal of trends in the second sub-period. This was partly 
due to assuming too low an increase in average current price spending, and 
partly to applying too high a price deflator in some years. Even the QEC final 
estimates, made after Budget-time data was available, tended to underestimate 
slightly the growth in the volume of public authorities' expenditure. 
By far the most serious and consistent bias in the QEC initial forecasts of 
national accounts components relates to the volume of gross fixed capital 
formation, which was greatly overpredicted in both sub-periods. In only three 
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years out of the eleven were our initial forecasts below the out-tum, while in 
many of the remaining eight years they were much too high, predicting 
substantial growth rather than an actual decline. For some individual years 
there are particular reasons for this discrepancy, such as failing to foresee 
cyclical downturns or significant increases in interest rates. However, 
underlying the general bias, especially during the second sub-period, is the 
tendency to apply to the forecasts a mental model of the economy in which 
sustained economic growth, which was correctly predicted, depends on rising 
investment, which, according to NIE estimates, did not take place. 
(e) Current Price Components 
Table 5: Current Price Components 
Annual Average Percentage Increase 
1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 
QEC Initial 
QECFinal 
NIEPrelim 
NIE Latest 
Current Price Stock Change 
(£m) 
83.5 121.0 100.5 
44.8 122.2 80.0 
102.7 121.8 111.4 
127.0 152.8 138.7 
Current Price Wages etc. Current Price Other Income 
6.3 6.4 6.4 10.3 11.0 10.6 
6.1 6.6 6.3 15.1 10.7 13.1 
5.7 6.5 6.1 15.8 8.1 12.3 
6.8 6.7 6.8 16.1 8.2 12.5 
For technical reasons the QEC forecasts of stock changes cannot be 
compared with NIE estimates in volume or constant price terms. However, 
because of the importance and volatility of stock changes in the national 
accounts, some comparison appears necessary and it is therefore presented at 
current prices. Somewhat to our surprise, there is relatively little bias, 
particularly between the initial forecasts and the preliminary NIE estimates, 
although in some individual years there were major discrepancies. In the second 
sub-period, the average QEC forecasts and estimates were very close to the 
preliminary NIE estimates, and even in the individual years the final QEC 
estimates were not seriously misleading. 
Turning from the expenditure to the income side of the national accounts, 
both the QEC and NIE only provide current price estimates. The average 
increase in both QEC initial forecasts and final estimates of aggregate wages, 
salaries and pensions lie within the range of NIE estimates for the period as a · 
whole, and very close to the NIE estimates for both sub-periods. Even with 
regard to individual years, the QEC forecasts have generally proved reasonably 
accurate, although it must be conceded that this is one of the least volatile 
elements of the national accounts. 
Other non~agricultural incomes, defined as trading profits of companies, 
other trading profits (including income from self-employment) and rent of 
dwellings, all adjusted for stock appreciation and for financial services, has been 
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much more volatile. The QEC initial forecasts were substantially too low in the 
first sub-period and significantly too high in the second. Final QEC estimates 
were reasonably close to the outcome in the first sub-period but too high in the 
second. The main reason for the recent overestimates in this item has been the 
failure to anticipate a steep rise in the adjustment elements, which are strongly 
negative, since 1991. 
(f) Other Indicators 
· Table 6: Employment Indicators 
Annual Average Percentage Increase 
1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 1984/9 1990/4 1984/94 
------
QEC Initial 
Actual 
Total Employment (April) Labour Force Unemployment 
(April) 
-0.2 0.8 
-0.6 1.7 
0.3 
0.5 
3.4 
1.9 
2.8 
2.2 
3.1 
2.0 
Live Register (Annual 
Average) 
2.6 
3.3 
0.2 
4.3 
1.5 
3.7 
Although national accounts components and aggregates provide the 
framework within which the QEC forecasts are constructed and presented, the 
forecasts also contain predictions of variables which are outside this framework. 
The most important of these concern employment, unemployment and the 
consumer price index. 
Because no official estimates are published of annual average employment 
totals, comparison has to be limited to the estimates based on the Labour Force 
Survey in April each year. The QEC forecasts presented here are those for the 
following April made in the preceding Summer issue of the QEC, when the full 
national accounts forecast for that year are first presented. There is no point in 
presenting the final QEC estimate, as by that time the preliminary labour force 
estimates are already available. 
It can be seen that the average QEC . forecasts of total employment were 
slightly optimistic in the first sub-period and pessimistic in the second 
sub-period and over the period as a whole. However, the degree of bias is 
relatively small, and the forecasts did predict the change in trend between the 
two sub-periods. 
Forecasts of unemployment, as recorded in the Labour Force Survey, are too 
pessimistic in both sub-periods. Conversely forecasts of the Live Register are 
much. too optimistic, especially in the second sub-period. This dichotomy arose 
from a failure to take sufficient account of the growing divergence between the 
Labour Force and Live Register measures of unemployment, which increased 
from 5,000 in April 1983 to 66,000 in April 1994. By virtually ignoring the 
autonomous element in the Live Register increase, we both under-predicted the 
growth in the numbers on the Register and imparted a downward bias to our 
employment forecasts. 
As with the employment and unemployment indicators, there is no point in 
comparing the final QEC estimates with the actual increase in the consumer 
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price index, as the actual result is known by the time the final QEC estimate is 
made. The QEC initial forecasts tend to be slightly too high in both sub-periods, 
although not to · an extent that was significantly misleading. In general, the 
reduction in the inflation rate from its high level in the early eighties to its fairly 
stable low level since 1987 was accurately predicted. 
Table 7: Consumer Price Index 
Annual Average Percentage Increase 
QEC Initial 
Actual 
1984/9 
4.7 
4.5 
3. Cyclical Timing and Amplitude 
1990/94 1984/94 
Consumer Price Index 
3.1 
2.7 
4.0 
3.7 
In the 1991 assessment of QEC forecasts, we found that the final QEC 
estimates tracked the course of the economic cycle, as defined by NIE estimates, 
with a high degree of accuracy. By contrast, the initial QEC forecasts showed 
insufficient amplitude in their variation, and tended to miss important cyclical 
turning points. To simplify the consideration of timing in the present excise, 
attention is focused on the growth of real expenditure on GNP. The cyclical 
movements of categories of expenditure by and large follow· a similar pattern 
and there is little to be gained by presenting the course of each. 
Figure 1 thus sets out the QEC initial forecasts and final estimates from 1984 
to 1994, compared with the latest NIE estimates from NIE 1994 and its 
FIGURE 1: Real GNP 1984-94 
Annual % Chan 
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41 
predecessors. Although the chart is largely self explanatory, it does require 
some interpretation. 
In the first place, the latest NIE estimates diverge quite significantly from 
earlier estimates, especially in 1985 and the period from 1991 to 1993. This has 
had the effect of weakening the fit between the QEC final estimates and the NIE 
results in the earlier sub-period, from 1984 to 1989. Conversely, it has greatly 
improved the fit over the second sub-period, from 1990 to 1994. Overall, it 
remains fair to claim that the final QEC estimates, which generally appear 
several months before the preliminary NIE estimates, have provided a 
reasonably accurate picture of the growth-path of the Irish economy. 
Turning to the more interesting issue of the predictive ability of the QEC 
initial forecasts, there would appear to have been a slight improvement with 
regard to timing between the first and second sub-periods. In the earlier period 
the initial forecasts failed to predict the deterioration in 1986 or the subsequent 
recovery in 1987, although the downturn in 1988 was predicted and the 
direction, but not the scale, of the upturn in 1989 was also foreseen. In the 
second· sub-period, the initial forecast of GNP growth of 51h per cent in 1990, the 
highest since 1978, was quite bold, and must be regarded as successful even 
though it fell short of the exceptional final outcome. The downturn in 1991 was 
accurately predicted, and the forecast of a continuation of moderate growth in 
1992 and 1993 was by no means misleading, with the predicted rate of growth in 
both years falling between the initial and latest NIE estimates. The apparent 
failure to predict the sharp up-tum in 1994 is discussed in detail later. 
The data underlying Figure 1 can be subjected to more formal analysis, in an 
attempt to discover the comparative predictive accuracy of the QEC forecasts. 
The most familiar test is to calculate the standard error of forecast according to 
the formula E = J ~ 1:,, (x, -x,); where E is the standard error of forecast, ~ is the 
actual result for year t, and Xt is the forecast for that year. For the purpose of 
this exercise, it has to be assumed that the latest NIE estimates measure the 
actual result x 1 for the growth in real GNP in each year. 
Table 8 sets out the standard error of forecast over the two sub-periods and 
the total period for various actual or hypothetical forecasts of real GNP growth. 
The predictors included in the analysis are the NIE Preliminary estimates; the 
QEC final estimates and initial forecasts, the post1acto trends for the entire 
period and for the two-sub-periods separately, the trend projected from the 
latest five year NIE estimates available at the time the QEC initial forecasts were 
made, and a smoothed exponential forecast based on data available at the time 
of the QEC initial forecast. 
In interpreting the table, it should be noted that the lower the standard error 
the more accurate the forecast, and that the method adopted, by squaring the 
annual errors, imposes a severe penalty for any year when, due to 
considerations of either timing or amplitude, the forecast diverges substantially 
from the actual result. 
The first two rows of the table indicate that over the entire period, the QEC 
final estimates have proved as accurate a predictor of the latest NIE estimates of 
real GNP growth as have the preliminary NIE estimates. 
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Table 8: Standard Errors of Forecast- Constant Price GNP Growth 
cf. NIE Latest Expenditure Estimate 
1984-89 1990-94 1984-94 
1 NIE Preliminary 0.83 1.67 1 1.04 1 
2 QEC Final Estimate 0.78 1.14 0.96 
3 QEC Initial Forecast 2.10 2.38 2.23 
4 Single Actual Trend 2.20 2.87 2.53 
5 Divided Actual Trend 1.95 2.64 2.29 
6 Projected 5-year Trend2 3.08 3.55 3.3 
7 Projected Exponential Smoothing3 4.04 3.93 3.99 
Notes: 1Excluding 1994, when, by definition, NIE preliminary and latest are identical. 
2Average growth rate in latest 5 years NIE estimates which were available 
during the preceding summer. 
3x , = x ,..1 + 1h(x,..1 - x,_:z), where x = GNP growth rate, and t, etc., represent the 
relevant years. 
Inevitably, the QEC initial forecast is less accurate. Nevertheless it performs 
significantly better than the application of a single observed trend line for the 
entire period. Even when the observed trend is split between the two sub 
periods, the QEC initial forecast outperforms it marginally over the entire 
period and significantly in the second sub-period. 
Of course, the actual trend-line is unavailable at the time initial forecasts are 
made, and to that extent it does not provide a fair basis of comparison. 
However, its inclusion in the table is justified as a strict post1acto check on the 
utility of short-term annual forecasts, and as a reassurance to medium-term 
forecasters that, if they can accurately predict the average growth-rate over a 
period, the annual discrepancies are likely to be not much greater than those 
involved in ad hoe short-term forecasting. 
The final two rows of Table 8 provide a fairer test of the efficacy of the QEC 
initial forecasts, as they are based on alternative projections using the 
information available at the time the forecast was made. The first represents a 
naive projection of the observed average growth rate over the preceding five 
years, while the second is based on the rate of growth in the latest two years. 
Both of these mechanical applications of past rates of growth produce standard 
errors of forecast substantially above those of the QEC initial forecast. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the judgement represented in the QEC 
initial forecasts yield slightly better results than the application of trend lines 
which can only be fitted with hindsight, and substantially better results than 
simple projections of past trends. It is also interesting to note that in absolute . 
terms the quality of QEC forecasts and estimates has deteriorated in the second 
sub-period compared with the first, but that in comparative terms the QEC has 
improved its performance in the second sub-period. The explanation for the 
deterioration in most predictions for the second sub-period lies partly in the 
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greater variability in the annual growth rates, and partly in the reduced 
availability of up-to-date information on trade-flows. 
4. Individual Years 
The course of our ,:real GNP forecasts, from the initial forecast to the final 
estimate, for each ye.ar. from 1984 to 1989 was discussed in the 1991 assessment. 
We do not intend to repeat this exercise here for the earlier years, as the only 
change has been that the range of "actual" results has widened with subsequent 
NIE revisions. However, the approach is instructive in understanding the 
influence of contemporary events on the evolution of forecasts, and will 
therefore be adopted for the years since 1990. As in the earlier exercise, both 
current and constant price GNP forecasts will be considered. 
(a) 1990 
As can be seen from a comparison of the (a) and (b) sections of Figure 2, the 
initial forecasts made in the summer of 1989 were slightly too high in current 
prices and too low in constant prices, implying too great an implied price 
deflater. During the remainder of 1989, both current and constant price forecasts 
fell, the former to within the correct range of outcomes and the latter further 
below the eventual result. In the case of the volume forecasts, the reduction in 
the main categories of expenditure, namely personal consumption, fixed 
investment and exports was broadly correct, but we failed to foresee the 
compensating rise in government consumption (after several years of decline) 
and stockbuilding, and the reduced rate of growth in imports and factor flows. 
Through the first half of 1990i~thetewas littlea£h:ange in the forecasts, as-
early indicators, especially in current prices, appea_red to confirm the predicted 
trend. It was not until the second half of 1990 that it became apparent that 
export prices were much lower than anticipated, and that the gap between value 
and volume growth would be much narrower than we had supposed. 
Thereafter, while the current price forecast remained more or less correct, the 
constant price forecast moved steadily towards the correct outcome, although it 
never quite reached the actual range of estimates. At the same time considerable 
amendments were made to the forecast composition of GNP, the most 
important being a major shift from exports to stockbuilding as the dramatic 
impact of mad-cow disease became clear. Nevertheless, the final estimates of 
real expenditure components remained significantly at variance with official 
estimates. Personal consumption was overestimated, due to over-reliance on the 
retail sales volume index, government consumption was understated, largely 
through the application of an unduly high price deflater, and fixed investment 
was underestimated because much of the actual increase occurred in 
non-dwelling building and construction, for which, at that time, there were 
virtually no current indicators. 
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FIGURE 2: GNP FORECASTS, 1990 
(A) Current Price, Annual % Change 
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(b) 1991 
The initial forecast for 1991 was made in the summer of 1990. Although in 
retrospect it is obvious that the recession in the USA and UK was already 
established by then, this was far from clear at the time. Most international 
agencies were still predicting a slowdown in growth rather than an actual fall in 
output. Moreover the initial forecast was drawn up immediately before the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait led to the threat of a Gulf War, and a dramatic increase in oil 
prices. Thus the initial forecast of a reduced, but still substantial, growth in the 
value and volume of GNP in 1991 was not unreasonable in the circumstances. 
As the extent of the recession in the major English-speaking economies 
became apparent, and as the situation in the Gulf developed, both the current 
and constant price forecasts were reduced. Throughout 1991 itself, the value and 
volume forecasts were fairly stable, although considerably below the actual 
range of outcomes. However, it is important to note that at all times the volume 
forecasts remained firmly positive, in contrast to those of some other analysts 
who were predicting stagnation or recession in the Irish economy. Finally in the 
Spring 1992 issue of the QEC a small upward revision in our estimates placed 
the volume increase within the range of NIE output estimates, although still 
below any of the NIE expenditure estimates. The final QEC value estimate 
remained below the range of NIE estimates. 
The main reason for the discrepancy between our later forecasts of the 
volume of GNP and the official NIE estimates was a failure to predict a large fall 
in the volume of net factor flows. Throughout the period the QEC forecasts of 
real GDP growth remained within, or slightly above, the eventual range of 
outcomes. Gradual changes to predictions for most components of GDP brought 
them into reasonable line with the NIE estimates by the time of the QEC final 
estimate. 
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FIGURE 3: GNP FORECASTS, 1991 
(A) Current Price, Annual % Change 
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(c) 1992 
Uncertainties concerning the state of the international economy led to some 
fluctuation in the first few forecasts of GNP growth in 1992. Early optimism 
concerning a relatively speedy recovery from the US and UK recessions faded, 
leading to downward revisions in the Autumn and Winter QECs. However, 
growing evidence of an upturn in domestic demand and strong export figures 
for the early months of the year encouraged upward revisions to our forecasts in 
the Spring and Summer issues. 
Then came the currency crisis in September. Although several previous 
Commentaries had warned of the dangers of a sterling devaluation before the end 
of 1992, Britain's decision to leave the ERM rather than to devalue within it had 
not been foreseen. The severe loss of short-term competitiveness and, more 
vitally, the escalation of interest rates obviously damaged the confidence on 
which the recovery in domestic demand earlier in the year had been based. 
Accordingly the predicted rate of GNP growth for 1992 was reduced in the 
Autumn QEC, and again in the final estimate in the following Spring issue. 
Strangely, through all these amendments, the forecasts of volume GNP growth 
remained within the range of outcomes, until the final estimate which was 
rather too low. 
The main reason for this final estimate being too low was an overestimate of 
the export price deflater, which meant that from accurate export value figures 
the extent of the volume growth of exports was underestimated. This same 
failure to predict the degree of decline in average export prices is one of the 
main reasons why the value forecasts of GNP growth remained too high almost 
throughout the period. 
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FIGURE 4: GNP FORECASTS, 1992 
(A) Current Price, Annual % Change 
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(d) 1993 
The initial forecasts for 1993 were made immediately before the currency 
crisis. It seemed reasonable at the time to project a continuation of the moderate 
increases in personal consumption and fixed investment which were becoming 
established in the first half of 1992. A slight slowdown in the rate of growth of 
exports was predicted as a consequence of the assumed devaluation of sterling 
within the ERM. 
Once the currency crisis had broken, it was obvious that uncertainty, 
coupled with very high interest rates, would adversely affect the trend of 
consumption and fixed investment. Exports were also likely to be impeded by 
the sheer scale of sterling depreciation and the cost of working capital to some 
Irish exporters. Throughout the autumn and early winter it remained unclear 
when and how the currency crisis would be resolved, and even after the 
devaluation of the Irish pound at the end of January, it was not immediately 
apparent what course Irish interest rates would follow in the remainder of the 
year. Thus it is not surprising that forecasts were reduced sharply in the 
Autumn and Winter Commentaries. As in the Gulf War period of 1991, it is 
noteworthy that the QEC forecasts remained positive throughout the currency 
crisis, even if they did dip below the eventual outcome. 
Even when it became clear that the interest rate penalty for devaluation was 
much less than had been feared, and when sterling appreciation fully restored 
Ireland's competitive position, the speed of recovery was difficult to predict. It 
was impossible to monitor fully the progress of the Irish economy in the 
remainder of 1993, because of the lateness of trade statistics and their lack of 
comparability with previous years due to the change of methodology imposed 
by the implementation of the Single European Market. In the circumstances it is 
remarkable that the QEC forecasts from the Summer 1993 issue onwards 
remained both steady and relatively close to the NIE 1994 estimates of growth in 
1993. 
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FIGURE 5: GNP FORECASTS, 1993 
(A) Current Price, Annual % Change 
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(e) 1994 
The initial QEC forecast for 1994 was, with hindsight, the poorest in the 
entire series since 1989, with the volume growth prediction over 4 per cent 
below the preliminary NIE estimate of expenditure growth. In mitigation, it can 
be pointed out that, when the forecast was made in the summer of 1993, most 
European analysts were predicting continued recession, the Irish recovery from 
the currency crisis was only beginning, and no trade statistics were available to 
show the strong export performance which was already taking place. Moreover, 
the forecast did show an increase of 1 per cent over the growth rate then 
predicted for 1993, and the text of the Commentary did make it clear that the 
forecast was a cautious one and might well be exceeded. Our caution was 
conditioned by the finding in our Spring 1991 Assessment that we had tended to 
underestimate the time-lags in responses to economic stimuli. Thus, while 
predicting that an economic recovery was due, moderate in Europe but strong 
in Ireland, we considered it most likely that the highest rate of growth would 
occur in 1995 rather than in 1994. 
From the Winter QEC onwards we revised our forecasts upwards fairly 
regularly as evidence accumulated that a major upswing had occurred earlier 
than had been expected. The delays in obtaining trade and balance of payments 
data were a contributory factor to our continuing to underpredict export growth 
and overpredict net factor outflows throughout 1994, while our tendency to 
overestimate the export price deflator led to the continuation of an undue gap 
between the value and volume forecasts. 
The final upward revisions made in the early months of 1995 took our value 
forecasts above the level of the preliminary NIE estimates and our volume 
forecasts close to the preliminary outcome. Of course, there is no way of 
knowing yet how future revisions to the NIE estimates will alter the picture of 
the economy in 1994. Our suspicion is that NIE estimates of the growth in 
domestic demand might be revised upwards, bringing them closer to the final 
QEC estimate, but that estimates of net exports, adjusted for factor flows, might 
be revised downwards, leaving little change in the estimated growth of real 
GNP. 
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FIGURE 6: GNP FORECASTS, 1994 
(A) Current Price, Annual% Change 
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5. Qualitative Implications 
Apart from presenting numerical forecasts, the QEC has an important role 
in providing qualitative assessments of the state of the economy and in drawing 
implications for policy from such assessments. It is obviously not feasible to 
present a detailed review of the conclusions of each Commentary since 1984, or 
even 1990. However it is possible to consider the major recurring themes in the 
QEC over the period and also to highlight any specific instances in which, with 
the benefit of hindsight, the advice given might have been counterproductive. 
In the Spring 1991 Assessment we found that. we could stand fully over the 
advice we had offered during the eighties. This initially stressed the absolute 
need to reduce the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement, and later advocated a 
consensus approach to economic policy within which reducing the debt ratio 
would remain a major, but no longer an overriding, aim, along with pay 
moderation, currency stability and social justice. A further recurring theme was 
the desirability of sectional groups taking a long-term view of their members' 
interests. From the perspective of an extra five years, this still appears to have 
been an appropriate corpus of advice, and, coincidentally or not, much of it has 
been adopted. 
Turning to the nineties, the dominant theme of the Commentaries has been 
that the Irish economy has been consistently outperforming its EU partners in 
terms of GNP growth, employment tr~nds, price stability, the current account 
balance of payments and restrained public borrowing. This has been interpreted 
as indicating that the broad consensus economic strategy has been successful, 
and that the policy debate should be concerned with the balance of priorities 
and relatively minor modifications within the framework of this strategy, and 
not with any radical change of direction. In this context of strategic continuity, 
support has been offered for the formalisation of the consensus approach 
through the renewal of national agreements, but only on the condition that their 
pay prov1s10ns remained sufficiently moderate to maintain Irish 
competitiveness. Particular stress has been laid on the need to reform the public 
service pay arbitration system, and, since this reform has been achieved, to 
ensure that indirect methods to achieve excessive increases in public service pay 
or conditions do not become established. 
While welcoming the explicit trade-off between pay moderation and 
gradual reductions in effective income tax rates, we have retained doubts about 
more radical tax reform as a panacea, and have been sceptical concerning the 
willingness of the electorate to accept alternative taxes as the price of reducing 
income tax rates. 
In general, the thrust of these analyses of domestic policy issues still seems 
to have been valid, and to have been borne out by the development of the 
economy. There are, however, two issues on which our analysis appears at times 
to have been deficient, and which could have led to inappropriate advice. 
With regard to the currency, in common with other analysts, we failed to. 
foresee the effective break-up of the ERM, and prior to the summer of 1992 
tended to take the stability of exchange rates for granted. Although we warned 
of a possible devaluation of sterling, we assumed that this would take place in 
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an orderly manner and would have no lasting consequences beyond a 
temporary improvement in UK competitiveness. Even after sterling and the lira 
were removed from the ERM, we tended to underestimate the speed with which 
UK interest rates would be reduced, the strength of the speculative forces 
against the remainder of the ERM, and the degree of market linkage between 
sterling and the Irish pound. In retrospect the suggestion in the Autumn 1992 
QEC that a strong internal adjustment package could have enabled parity to be 
maintained with the DM within a narrow band ERM was not realistic. This 
attempt to seek an alternative to devaluation was coloured by the fact that, 
along with many others, we overestimated the likely impact of devaluation on 
inflation and int,erest rates in the particular circumstances of 1993. 
Since the broadening of the ERM bands in the summer of 1993, our 
assessment has been that allowing both the currency and interest rates to vary 
should prevent excessive changes in either, and enable the trade weighted value 
of the Irish pound to remain reasonably stable. So far, this prescription has 
remained valid, although, as we have frequently warned, sterling weakness 
could pose the awkward question as to whether Ireland should maintain its 
current parity within the ERM if this requires both higher interest rates and a 
further loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis the UK. Meanwhile, we would certainly 
still stand over our repeated advice that individuai companies should protect 
themselves as far as possible against currency fluctuations, particularly with 
regard to sterling. 
The other major area where, with hindsight, our analysis appears 
questionable is that of unemployment. Our preoccupation with the need for 
sustained net job creation to tackle the twin social evils of unemployment and 
involuntary emigration requires no justification. Nor does our repeated 
assertion that balanced economic growth would result in a substantial rise in 
employment. However, our reports on progress in this direction have tended to 
be unduly pessimistic in tone, because of an undue reliance on the Live Register 
as a short term measure of unemployment trends. A failure to recognise and 
highlight the large and growing divergence between the Live Register and the 
consistent Labour Force Survey measure of unemployment could have 
contributed to a national perception that the present economic strategy was 
incapable of delivering a substantial reduction in total unemployment. 
On balance, however, and despite these two cases of deficient analysis, most 
of the discussion in the QEC over the past eleven years seems able to withstand 
the scrutiny of hindsight. In particular, errors of forecasting, with regard either 
to the composition of growth or to its timing, do not appear to have precipitated 
serious misdiagnosis of economic problems or dangerously inappropriate 
prescriptions. 
6. Conclusions 
(a) Judged against the range of subsequent official estimates, the QEC 
forecasts and estimates since 1984 show little or no consistent bias in 
relation to the key economic variables of GNP, employment and 
consumer prices. If anything, there was a slight tendency towards the 
pessimistic, especially in the second sub-period from 1990 to 1994. 
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(b) The QEC initial forecasts correctly predicted the strong improvement in 
the trend of these major variables between the 1984/89 and the 1990/94 
sub-periods. 
(c) At a less aggregate level, the initial QEC forecasts tended to 
over-predict the growth in domestic demand, especially fixed 
investment, and under-predict the growth in net exports. 
(d) The degree of revision in NIE estimates for many components of GNP, 
are themselves rather disturbing, and complicate the task of assessing 
the accuracy of forecasts. 
(e) The most glaring bias in the QEC forecasts related to the Live Register. 
This apparent optimism arose entirely from a failure to predict the 
massive divergence between the Live Register and labour force 
measures of unemployment. Influenced by contemporary Live Register 
trends, QEC forecasts of labour force unemployment tended to be too 
pessimistic. 
(f) The accuracy of final QEC estimates in tracking the cyclical path of 
economic growth deteriorated compared with the result found in the 
1991 assessment. This can be attributed partly to late NIE revisions for 
the 1984/89 sub-period and mainly to the absence of up-to-date trade 
and balance of payments statistics for part of the 1990/94 sub-period. 
(g) The temporal fit between the initial QEC forecasts and the latest NIE 
estimates was rather better in the second sub-period than the first, 
despite the occurrence of such unforeseen external shocks as the Gulf 
War and the effective collapse of the ERM. Even the failure to 
incorporate the strong recovery in 1994 in the initial forecast for that 
year was mitigated by suggestions in the accompanying text that the 
rapid growth then expected for 1995 could in fact come in 1994. 
(h) Statistical tests demonstrate that the standard error of forecast of the 
QEC initial forecasts was considerably lower than that of alternative 
naive projections, and slightly better than that obtained by fitting 
post-facto trend lines to the period. 
(i) The accurate early prediction of cyclical turning points remains an 
endemic problem. One major difficulty in this regard is that the 
international agencies and sister institutes in other countries, on which 
we rely for forecasts of the international economic environment, 
themselves have a very indifferent record in predicting the timing and 
amplitude of international economic cycles. 
(j) Even with the benefit of hindsight we would be prepared to re-iterate 
most of the qualitative analysis and policy recommendations made 
during the period under review. The two issues on which we would 
now at least change our emphasis, namely the currency crisis in late 
1992 and the intractability of the unemployment problem, appear to be 
more than counterbalanced by the consistent support given to a 
balanced, consensual, economic strategy which has been a fundamental 
factor in Ireland's relatively good economic performance since the late 
'80s. 
56 
(k) We believe that this exercise has shown that, despite some continuing 
weaknesses, the QEC has presented reasonably accurate and consistent 
forecasts over the past eleven years, and has offered generally sound 
analysis and advice over the same period. However, aspects of such an 
exercise are always salutary, and we shall continue to stress the 
considerable degree of uncertainty which inevitably is attached to any 
economic forecast. 
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